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This paper investigates the extent to which it is possible for speculative attacks to be predictable
given information on economic fundamentals. A standard model of predictable attacks is
extended to incorporate an optimizing monetary authority. It is shown that while incorporating
a forward-looking monetary authority improves our understanding of many observed phenomena,
it also implies that the branch of the literature that places emphasis on predictable movements
in fundamentals cannot generate predictable speculative attacks. In addition, the model provides
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Speculation and the Decision to Abandon
a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
Abstract
This paper investigates the extent to which it is possible for speculative attacks to be predictable
given information on economic fundamentals. A standard model of predictable attacks is
extended to incorporate an optimizing monetary authority. It is shown that while incorporating
a forward-looking monetary authority improves our understanding of many observed phenomena,
it also implies that the branch of the literature that places emphasis on predictable movements
in fundamentals cannot generate predictable speculative attacks. In addition, the model provides
useful insights into the viability of temporary nominal anchor policies, and a theoretical
foundation for an important empirical methodology. 
1. Introduction
One of the central questions about speculative attacks on fixed exchange rate regimes is
the degree to which they are predictable given information on the fundamentals of the economy.
Much discussion centers around whether a particular crisis such as the breakdown in the
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992-93, the Mexican peso in 1994, or the Thai baht in
1997, was the result of predictable deterioration of fundamentals or a sudden switch from one
equilibrium to another based on self-fulfilling expectations. The question is theoretically
interesting, and of central practical importance. If most attacks are due to predictable movements
in fundamentals then fixed exchange rates may be attractive as long as the monetary authority
is willing to subordinate its other goals to the exchange rate policy. On the other hand, if self-
fulfilling expectations of crises are common then even if the monetary authority does everything
right it may still not be able to avoid a speculative attack. Both types of attacks are supported by1The predictable attack literature was started by  Krugman (1979) and Salant and Henderson (1978). The multiple
equilibria explanation of speculative attacks is due to Flood and Garber (1984a) in the natural resource context, and
Obstfeld (1986) in the fixed exchange rate context. Surveys of this extensive literature are given by Agénor,
Bhandari, and Flood (1992), Blackburn and Sola (1993), and Flood and Marion (1997).
2For example, see the innovative work of Jeanne (1997).
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extensive theoretical literatures.
1 Since theory has provided little guidance on this issue,
economists have had to address the very difficult task of trying to differentiate these views
empirically.
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This paper reexamines the possibility of predictable speculative attacks. It argues that the
theoretical literature that finds that speculative attacks may be predictable suffers from an
important shortcoming. It relies heavily on the assumption of a myopic monetary authority. Once
a forward-looking central bank is incorporated very different, but equally interesting conclusions
arise.
This literature grew from a framework developed by Krugman (1979) based on a
mechanism by Salant and Henderson (1978). This framework posits a central bank with limited
resources which is pursuing a fixed exchange rate policy but also has other, higher priority,
policies that are fundamentally inconsistent with the exchange rate policy in the long run.
Speculators are forward looking. They foresee the eventual abandonment of the fixed rate regime
and the potential profit opportunities that might occur. As soon as profit opportunities begin to
manifest themselves they attempt to exploit them by buying the central bank’s foreign currency
reserves in a sudden attack, forcing the early abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime.
This structure is intuitive, elegant, and empirically tractable. Moreover, many countries
which have experienced foreign exchange crises do indeed seem to have been pursuing other
policies which appear to have been at odds with the fixed exchange rate system. Therefore the
basic structure is quite attractive, and it has fared well empirically. It suffers, however, from an
important shortcoming. In these models speculators are rational, forward-looking agents who are
able to foresee the inevitable collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime, whereas the central bank
is not. Even if we assume that the central bank makes maintaining the fixed exchange rate regime
a high priority, it would still realize that indefinite maintenance is impossible given its other- 3 -
objectives. It would therefore take steps to minimize the costs associated with the inevitable
collapse of the fixed exchange rate system.
It is not clear that the results of these models are robust to the inclusion of an optimizing
central bank. If the structure is extended to allow for a forward-looking, optimizing central bank
then strategic interaction between speculators and the monetary authority becomes critical to the
analysis. Since the central bank would foresee the speculative attack, it would be tempted to
abandon the fixed exchange rate just before the crisis, thereby avoiding large reserve losses.
However, if it was optimal for the central bank to do so, rational speculators would take this into
account and change their strategies, potentially altering the date or nature of the attack. I examine
this issue, analyzing strategic interaction between speculators and an optimizing central bank in
a linear version of the Krugman model developed by Flood and Garber (1984b). There are five
reasons why it is important to do so.
1.1. Theoretical Necessity
First, it is necessary to include a forward-looking monetary authority on purely theoretical
grounds. The most widely used, most often cited, and most empirically tractable class of
speculative attack models do not tell a consistent story. The driving force of these models is
sophisticated, forward-looking behavior on the part of speculators, and completely myopic
behavior on the part of the central bank. Therefore it is important to examine whether the general
conclusions of this class of models are robust to a more realistic specification of central bank
behavior.
There has been some recent work examining strategic interaction between optimizing
central banks and foreign currency speculators. However, these papers do not permit an
examination of the predictability of speculative attacks. They either focus on self-fulfilling3These papers include Cole and Kehoe (1996a and 1996b), Davies and Vines (1995),  Obstfeld (1994 and 1996),
Ozkan and Sutherland (1998), and Velasco (1997).
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expectations of attacks,
3 or they construct models which bypass the issue. In Andersen (1994)
and Morris and Shin (1998) there is no element of predictability in the economy so the issue of
attack predictability does not arise. Ozkan and Sutherland (1994 and 1995) examine the behavior
of optimizing central banks in models where the central bank cares about speculation through
its influence on the interest rate, but it does not find attacks themselves detrimental. While these
paper capture an important element of reality, central banks also have a strong aversion to
speculative attacks themselves. Attacks have significant, and long-lasting political and economic
consequences that go far beyond instantaneous, momentary increases in interest rates.
In this paper I construct an optimizing version of a standard, and widely used model of
predictable speculative attacks. The central bank has an objective function which gives it an
incentive to avoid sudden speculative attacks, if possible. It is shown that when the central bank
dislikes speculative attacks a very different type of strategic interaction arises. Rather than simply
choosing a critical level of fundamentals to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime and
accepting a speculative attack, the monetary authority has an incentive to try to preempt an
expected attack by abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime before it occurs. Of course
speculators will try to predict this preemptive abandonment and exploit it through their foreign
currency purchases. In equilibrium, the central bank will deliberately introduce uncertainty into
the decisions of speculators. By making it difficult for speculators to predict the conditions under
which it will change the exchange rate policy, the central bank can hope to avoid a speculative
attack.
This incentive to introduce uncertainty into the decisions of speculators has not
previously been analyzed. It has significant implications for our understanding of the period
leading up to changes in exchange rate policy. It implies that the uncertainty associated with
these policy changes may not be an exogenous feature of fixed exchange rates, but may be
introduced endogenously, and deliberately by the monetary authorities in an attempt to avoid
speculative attacks. Note, however, that one of the main arguments in favor of fixed exchange- 5 -
rates is that they may decrease the exchange rate uncertainty inherent in a floating rate system.
The results of this paper suggest that, in practice, the incentives of the monetary authorities may
lead them to deliberately reintroduce much of this uncertainty in an attempt to avoid speculative
attacks.
1.2. Explains Observed Behavior
Secondly, the inclusion of an optimizing monetary authority leads to theoretical results
which are closer to observed behavior. Typically breakdowns of fixed exchange rate regimes are
preceded by increasing interest differentials, and increasing forward exchange rate premia. The
breakdowns are accompanied by large depreciations of the domestic currency. None of these
features are present in non-stochastic versions of these models. They can be generated in
stochastic versions but then the length of the period of increasing interest rates and forward
exchange rate premia is directly related to the size of the expected shocks. Moreover, interest
differentials and forward rate premia must be less than they would be in a floating exchange rate
regime. Additionally, in the traditional models the size of a jump in the exchange rate is directly
related to the size of the last shock. In fact the magnitude of the jump must be less than the jump
that would occur if the same shock hit in a flexible exchange rate environment. So, while these
models are not inconsistent with observed behavior, it seems difficult to believe that the
ubiquitous and dramatic depreciations which accompany fixed exchange rate abandonments are
all driven by large exogenous shocks.
However, when we include an optimizing monetary authority, the incentive to introduce
uncertainty into the decisions of speculators implies that these empirically observed phenomena
(increasing interest rates, forward exchange rate premia, and large jumps in the exchange rate
after the collapse of the fixed rate) arise in equilibrium even in a completely non-stochastic
framework. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to argue that exogenous shocks are large in order
to explain observed crises using this class of model.- 6 -
1.3. A Foundation for an Empirical Methodology
The third useful implication of introducing a non-myopic central bank is that it helps
provide a theoretical foundation for a useful empirical methodology. Cumby and Van Wijnbergen
(1989) develop an elegant method of estimating the evolution of a crisis when agents do not
perfectly foresee the collapse. They capture the idea that changing the exchange rate regime is
a policy decision by making the ad hoc assumption that the conditional p.d.f. of the level of
reserves at the time of abandonment is distributed uniformly. This specification permits a very
rich stochastic structure and has been quite successful empirically. However, the ad hoc nature
of the specification has made the approach unattractive to many practitioners.
In my paper, the inclusion of an optimizing central bank allows for the explicit derivation
of the probability of abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime in each state. This derived
expression for the probability of abandoning the fixed exchange rate is remarkably similar to that
assumed by Cumby and Van Wijnbergen. Hence it is possible to think of this paper as a
theoretical foundation for their earlier empirical work, or, conversely, their empirical work as an
ex ante test of this type of model.
1.4. Are Temporary Nominal Anchor Policies Viable?
The fourth reason why it is important to include an optimizing monetary authority in a
model of fixed exchange rate abandonment is that it provides insight into the viability of nominal
anchor policies. It is often suggested that a temporary fixed exchange rate policy can be useful
in providing a “nominal anchor” to help stop runaway, expectations-driven inflation. The idea
is that by making a highly-visible commitment to maintaining one nominal price the monetary
authority can encourage rapid expectations adjustment, and hence control inflation quickly.  - 7 -
Of course, fixed exchange rate policies in highly inflationary environments are inherently
dangerous. The risk of a speculative attack is always present. If the policy works, however, it
would only need to be in place for a short time. As soon as inflation expectations adjust it should
be possible to abandon the fixed exchange rate policy. Unfortunately, if the central bank is
planning to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime, speculators would attempt to exploit this
through their foreign currency purchases. Therefore, it is not clear that a smooth transition out
of a temporary nominal anchor policy is consistent with rational expectations on the part of
speculators. While these policies are often recommended for high inflation countries, no
theoretical work has been done to investigate these difficulties involved in ending a fixed
exchange rate policy gracefully.
 By introducing an optimizing central bank into the Krugman model of speculative
attacks, one can analyze this issue in a consistent manner. The results suggest that it may, in fact,
be possible for central banks to extricate themselves from fixed exchange rate regimes without
speculative attacks, but it will be a chancy undertaking. The line between success and failure will
be very fine indeed.
1.5. Are Predictable Attacks Possible?
Lastly, the inclusion of an optimizing central bank in this framework permits new insights
into the nature of speculative attacks themselves. It is shown that with an optimizing monetary
authority speculative attacks based on predictable movements in fundamentals are not possible.
This is true even when the central bank has only a single policy instrument available to avoid
speculative attacks. The branch of the speculative attack literature that places its emphasis on
predictable movements in fundamentals cannot generate speculative attacks when we allow for
forward-looking monetary authorities. This suggests that any observed speculative attacks must
be due to multiple equilibria.- 8 -
Moreover, these results also have important implications for what types of events can
trigger an attack. In the multiple equilibria explanation for speculative attacks it has been difficult
to pin down what events might trigger a switch between equilibria. While my paper does not
solve this problem, it does offer strong intuition about what types of events cannot trigger an
attack. In equilibrium even with a single policy instrument, forward-looking central banks can
avoid predictable speculative attacks, albeit at considerable cost. This suggests that the timing
of speculative attacks must be unpredictable. Hence, with multiple equilibria, the mechanism
used by speculators to coordinate their expectations on the attack equilibrium must be based on
non-predictable variables. 
The starting point for this paper is a widely used version of the Krugman (1979) model
of speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates. The goal here is not to provide a realistic
description of an attack episode. Rather the aim is to develop a clear understanding of the
strategic interaction between speculators and a monetary authority which wishes to avoid
speculative attacks. To this end a very simple and transparent version of the model is chosen in
order to make the mechanism at work as clear as possible. The reader should be aware, however,
that this stylized structure has been greatly extended by many authors, so a large number of more
realistic and detailed models of speculative attacks use essentially the same mechanism. The
standard model is developed in some detail in section 2. Then, in section 3, it is expanded to
include an explicitly optimizing central bank. The paper is concluded in section 4, where the
implications for our understanding of the breakdown of fixed exchange rates are discussed.
2. The Model with a Myopic Central Bank
Before introducing the optimization problem of the central bank, it is useful to consider
the problem as it is usually presented, with fully rational speculators and a myopic central bank.4This is the money supply specification which is standard in the speculative attack literature. In this context if the
money supply is set to R &+Dt during the floating exchange rate period, this specification is equivalent to a
specification in differences Mt
s-Mt-1
s = St(rt-rt-1) + ( Dt-Dt-1) where rt is central bank holdings of foreign currency
denominated in foreign currency. This is because in the fixed exchange rate period the exchange rate is constant,
and in the floating rate period foreign currency reserves are constant. To facilitate direct comparison with the
existing literature this standard and innocuous short cut will be used.
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This framework posits a central bank with limited reserves which is pursuing a fixed exchange
rate policy but also has other, higher priority, policies which are fundamentally inconsistent with
the exchange rate policy in the long run. The model used here is a non-stochastic version of a
well-known model by Flood and Garber (1984b). It is a single good, small open economy model
in which purchasing power parity implies that,
     Pt = St Pt
* (1)
at all times t, where St is the domestic currency price of foreign currency, Pt is the domestic price
level, and Pt
* is the foreign currency price of output which is assumed constant and normalized
to 1. Uncovered interest parity is assumed to hold in each period,
     it = i
* + Et [ (St+1/St) -1 ] (2)
where it is the nominal interest rate on domestic securities and i
* is the nominal interest rate on
foreign securities, which is assumed to be constant. Money demand is given by,
Mt
d / Pt = á - âit (3)
It is assumed that money demand is positive when the domestic interest rate is equal to the world
rate, (á-âi
*)>0. The money supply consists of the book value of central bank foreign currency
reserves Rt and domestic credit Dt,
4
  Mt
s = Rt + Dt (4)
and the evolution of domestic credit follows the exogenous process,
  Dt = Dt-1 + µ (5)- 10 -
where µ is a positive constant. In this model the parameter µ represents the other higher priority
policies of the central bank which are inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate policy in the long
run. µ is usually interpreted as a need to monetize a fiscal deficit.
In this myopic case, as long as its reserves are above a critical level R & the central bank
pursues a fixed exchange rate policy, buying and selling foreign currency on demand, at the
exchange rate S &. Once its reserves fall to R & the central bank must leave the foreign exchange
market forever and the exchange rate will float freely. The assumption of limited reserves has
received considerable criticism since it implies a limit to the ability of countries to borrow. This
criticism is particularly relevant to the breakdown in the EMS, since the European countries
abandoned the exchange rate mechanism long before their borrowing capacities were exhausted.
One of the interesting implications that will emerge from the analysis here is that with an
optimizing monetary authority the fixed exchange rate mechanism will usually be abandoned
before reserves fall to their lower limit. With an optimizing central bank reserves can be
substantially above R & at the time of the move to a floating exchange rate system. However, for
now consider the traditional case where the central bank abandons the fixed exchange rate system
if, and only if, reserves fall to R &.
Suppose that speculators expected that the central bank would never abandon the fixed
exchange rate regime, Et[St+1]=S & for all t. In that case from equations (1)-(4),
    Rt + Dt = (á-âi
*)S & (6)
since (2) would imply that it=i
* at all times. Domestic credit is increasing over time so reserves
must be decreasing and the fixed exchange rate will be abandoned at the state T ~ defined by,
 (7) D˜ T ' (á&âi () ¯ S & ¯ R
Therefore it is not rational for speculators to believe that the fixed exchange rate will be
maintained indefinitely. Hence, to solve the speculators’ optimization problem, it is necessary
to determine the exchange rate that will prevail after the fixed rate regime is abandoned.
Define the shadow floating exchange rate, S ~
t, as the exchange rate that would prevail if
the exchange rate were floating at t. In order for the exchange rate to be floating, it must be that5Obstfeld (1986) shows that this is, in fact, the only possible “market-clearing” equilibrium in the model. If the
analysis is expanded to include the full range of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (allowing for the possibility of
shortages of foreign currency during a speculative attack) additional equilibria can emerge, see Pastine (1996 and
1998). However, to facilitate comparison with the bulk of the existing literature, these equilibria are suppressed here
and attention is focused solely on market-clearing equilibria.
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reserves fell to R & at one point, and after that point all foreign currency transaction will take place
in private markets so the money supply will simply be R &+Dt. Equations (1)-(5) would yield,
      [(á-âi
*)+â] S ~
t = [ R & + Dt ] + â Et[ S ~
t+1]( 8 )
Assuming no speculative bubbles in the floating rate period, this difference equation implies that,
(9)
If the shadow floating exchange rate is less than the fixed exchange rate then there is
clearly no incentive for speculators to engage in a speculative attack. An attack would cause a
breakdown of the exchange rate regime and speculators would make a loss. Therefore no
individual speculator would hold foreign currency during an attack, and so an attack cannot
occur. Speculators will therefore wait until the post-attack exchange rate equals the fixed rate.
At that point if the breakdown is delayed there will be profits to be made by speculating in
foreign currency. In this model, competition for speculative profits ensures that a speculative
attack occurs the instant they become available. Therefore the attack must occur at the state
where S ~
t=S & so that there is no instantaneous jump in the exchange rate.
5
Defining T & as the date of the speculative attack in this traditional version of the model
S ~
T & =S & yields,
       DT &  =  (á-âi
*)S & - R & - [âµ/ (á-âi
*)] (10)
Together with equations (7) and (5) this means that T ~-T &= â/(á-âi
*), implying that the speculative
attack will cause the collapse of the fixed exchange rate before it would otherwise be abandoned.
Figure 1 shows the path of reserves.- 12 -
Figure 1: Reserves with a Myopic Central Bank
Initially reserves follow (6), declining one-for-one with the expansion of domestic credit. At T &,
however, the shadow floating exchange rate rises to the fixed rate and the remaining µâ/(á-âi
*)
reserves are purchased in a sudden speculative attack which forces the abandonment of the fixed
rate regime.
3. An Optimizing Central Bank
An important shortcoming of  this traditional version of the model is that forward-looking
private agents are anticipating the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate regime but the central
bank is not. The speculative attack results in a sudden drop in foreign currency reserves at T &. If
this is undesirable it can be easily avoided by simply abandoning the fixed rate at time T &-1. A
rational central bank should realize that the move to a floating rate system is inevitable. The only
open issue for the central bank is how painful that move will be and whether there are any
alternative strategies which might make it somewhat less costly.6Anderson (1994) presents an elegant model endogenizing central bank preferences for fixed exchange rates in a
related context.
7Note that Rt is the book value of reserves, and (1) implies that the price level is equal to the exchange rate. Thus,
in the fixed rate period the real value of central bank reserves is equal to Rt/S &. In the flexible exchange rate period
all foreign currency transactions take place in private markets, so the real value of reserves does not change.
Therefore, the central bank’s one period payoff is just the real value of reserves, normalized for algebraic
convenience (and minus a constant if the exchange rate is floating).
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3.1. The Central Bank’s Problem
To analyze this issue, an objective function for the central bank is required. There are any
number of such objective functions available and any choice is necessarily imperfect. The central
results of this paper require that the objective function have two features. First, the central bank
must dislike speculative attacks, with the degree of distaste being continuous in the size of the
attack. Second, in the absence of an attack, the central bank must prefer to maintain the fixed
exchange rate.
In the proceeding analysis the focus will be on how the existence of an optimizing central
bank changes the speculators’ problem. Hence, it is convenient to have the central bank’s
objective function depend directly on speculators’ choice variable. In this stylized model
movements in reserves can be used as a proxy for the real costs of speculative attacks that are
present in more realistic models. It is therefore assumed that the central bank prefers more
reserves to less, and fixed exchange rates to floating exchange rates. The first assumption will
imply that speculative attacks are undesirable for the central bank. The second assumption makes
it possible to rationalize the initial existence of the fixed exchange rate regime.
6 Formally, at the
end of each period t, the central bank will receive a payoff of Rt if the exchange rate is fixed, and
Rt-Ã if the exchange rate is floating,
7 where Ã>0. The future is discounted at the rate ä0(0,1).
When the fixed rate is abandoned, all foreign currency transactions take place in private
markets so central bank’s per period payoff in each period will be Rt-Ã if the exchange rate is
abandoned in t. Hence, if the fixed rate is abandoned then the expected present value of the










is not abandoned, future foreign currency transactions will take place with the central bank.
Therefore the expected payoff from this strategy depends on what the central bank expects will
happen in the future. The expected present value of the central bank’s objective function is the
maximum of the value if it abandons the fixed exchange rate, or the value of the game if it does
not.
(11)
This maximization problem is subject to the constraint that if reserves fall to R & the central bank
must switch to floating exchange rates. The central bank compares the benefit from abandoning
the fixed exchange rate system with the current and expected future value of maintaining it.
This specification implies that if the central bank is expecting a speculative attack, it will
find it optimal to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime in the period before the attack. That
is, if in the coming period the expected drop in reserves is large, the central bank will move to
a floating exchange rate regime to avoid the attack. For given expectations of future reserves, a
higher value of Rt implies a larger expected drop in reserves. Notice that Et(Vt+1) includes
information on the expected level of future reserves. Therefore, for a given value of Vt+1, high
current period reserves make abandoning the fixed exchange rate system more attractive to the
central bank. The central bank simply has more to lose by waiting.
Since the central bank is pursuing a fixed exchange rate policy, it must find it optimal to
do so. This places a lower bound on the value of the parameter Ã, the central bank’s preference
for fixed exchange rates. To derive this lower bound notice that the opportunity cost of waiting
one period to abandon the fixed exchange rate is given by the value of abandoning in period t
minus the discounted value of abandoning in period t+1,
(12)- 15 -
For the choice of a fixed exchange rate to have ever been optimal, this opportunity cost must be
less than the benefit of waiting when there is no speculative attack, Rt. This reduces to,
ä (Rt -Rt+1) < (1-ä) Ã (13)
When there is no speculative attack, reserves are given by (6). From equation (5), this implies
that (Rt-Rt+1)=µ and (13) becomes,
       äµ < (1-ä) Ã (14)
The benefit from having a fixed exchange rate (Ã) must be large relative to the inevitable reserve
losses due to expanding domestic credit (µ). This condition must hold for the choice of a fixed
exchange rate to have been optimal, and will therefore be assumed. 
3.2. The Speculators’ Problem
The solution to the speculators’ problem is still described by uncovered interest parity,
(2). However, speculators will be aware that the central bank may decide to allow the exchange
rate to float before reserves fall to R &. If it decides to do this the floating exchange rate will no
longer be described by (9). To describe the shadow floating exchange rate let S ~
￿,t denote the
exchange rate that would prevail at t if the exchange rate was first floated in ô. So the first
subscript gives the date the fixed exchange rate was abandoned and the second subscript refers
to the current date. Notice that the interpretation of that shadow floating exchange rate in the
optimizing model is slightly different than it is in the myopic model. In the myopic model S ~
t is
the exchange rate that will prevail if there is a speculative attack. In the optimizing model S ~
t,t is
the exchange rate that will prevail if the central bank abandons the fixed exchange rate. The
difference arises because here the central bank may choose to abandon the fixed exchange rate






Since all foreign currency transactions in the floating rate period take place in private
markets, the money supply will be R￿+Dt and equations (1)-(5) yield,
     [(á-âi
*)+â] S ~
￿,t = [ R￿ + Dt ] + â Et[ S ~
￿,t+1] (15)
Assuming no speculative bubbles in the floating rate period, this difference equation implies that
the shadow floating exchange rate can be expressed as,
(16)
If speculators were not holding very much foreign currency at the time of the abandonment, then
the money supply will be relatively high, resulting in a high path for the floating exchange rate.
Thus if reserves are high at the time of the move to a floating exchange rate then the exchange
rate itself will be relatively high as well. In fact, if speculators did not expect a change in the
fixed exchange rate, reserves would be given by equation (6) and the shadow floating exchange
rate would be strictly greater than the fixed rate,
                                                  âµ
   { S ~
t,t  
/
 E(qt)=0}   =   S &  +   )))))))) (17)
                                               (á-âi
*)
2
where qt is the probability that the central bank abandons the fixed exchange rate. This implies
that the shadow floating exchange rate will always be at least as high as the fixed rate since
otherwise speculators would find it profitable to sell foreign currency, thereby increasing the
money supply and raising the shadow floating exchange rate.
3.3. Equilibrium
In the standard model where the central bank remains passive, speculators attack the fixed
exchange rate as soon as the shadow floating exchange rate rises to the fixed rate. However, this




ä Rt%1 & Ã
(1&ä)
before the attack. By abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime one period early the central bank
would avoid the speculative attack at the cost of one less period of fixed exchange rates. One
might presume that this would be an equilibrium, since in the traditional model with a myopic
central bank, the shadow floating exchange rate does not rise to the fixed rate until one period
later. However, this is not the case. If the central bank chooses to abandon the fixed exchange
rate when reserves are still above R & then the shadow floating exchange rate will be
correspondingly higher and speculators will find it profitable to stage a slightly smaller attack in
the beginning of that period.
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be constructed by backward induction. To do
so, note that reserves will be driven down to R & in period T & if the fixed exchange rate has not been
abandoned before that time. This follows directly from the argument made in the myopic case.
This means that qT &=1. Given this, it is possible to examine the optimal central bank strategy in
T &-1. And from this it is possible to examine the optimal central bank strategy in T &-2, and so on.
Since the argument will be used repetitively to work backward from T &, it is helpful to
state it generally. Consider a time t<T & where qt+1>0. That is, in the coming period there will be
a positive probability that the central bank will abandon the fixed exchange rate. The central bank
must find this optimal in period t+1, which implies that it either strictly prefers to abandon the
fixed rate regime in t+1 or it is indifferent between abandoning and maintaining the fixed
exchange rate. In either case, from equation (11) the maximized expected present value of its
objective function is given by Vt+1=(Rt+1-Ã)/(1-ä). The equilibrium at t can then be established
by a process of elimination, starting from the potential pure-strategy equilibria.
Proposition: With short period lengths no pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
Proof: Consider first whether it is possible for qt=1 to be an equilibrium. If so, then it must be





ä Rt%1 & Ã
(1&ä)
This inequality reduces to,
ä(Rt - Rt+1) $ (1-ä) Ã (19)
Speculators must be behaving optimally as well. Since qt=1, there will be profit opportunities for
speculators as long as the shadow floating exchange rate is above the fixed rate. Speculators
exploit these profits by purchasing foreign currency which decreases the money supply and thus
the shadow floating exchange rate. Competition for these speculative profits ensures that the
shadow floating exchange rate is driven down to the fixed rate, S ~
t,t=S &. This yields,
   Rt + Dt = (á-âi
*)S & - [âµ/(á-âi
*)] (20)
and speculation in t+1 will only continue as long as the shadow floating exchange rate is at least
as high as the fixed rate, S ~
t+1,t+1$S &, an inequality since qt+1 may be less than one. This implies
  Rt+1 + Dt+1 $ (á-âi
*)S & - [âµ/(á-âi
*)] (21)
Therefore optimal behavior for speculators implies,
            Rt - Rt+1 # Dt+1 -Dt = µ (22)
So in equilibrium both (19) and (22) must hold which implies äµ$(1-ä)Ã. This contradicts
equation (14), so qt=1 cannot be an equilibrium.
Intuitively, if the central bank plans to abandon the fixed exchange rate, speculators will
try to take advantage of this by purchasing foreign currency, resulting in low central bank
reserves. So when the time comes for the central bank to actually implement the switch to the
floating rate, it will find that its reserves are already quite low. The damage from speculators has
already been done. The additional damage that they might do if the central bank waits one more
period is relatively small. So it is in the central bank’s best interest to continue maintaining the
fixed exchange rate. Switching exchange rate regimes at time t with certainty in order to avoid
a speculative attack in t+1 cannot be an equilibrium.
Now consider the conditions that are necessary for qt=0 to be an equilibrium. For the
choice of qt=0 to be optimal for the central bank it must be that,
(23)8One could of course formulate the problem in continuous time and the equilibrium would be identical to
equilibrium of the discrete-time model presented here (derivation available from the author). Discrete time was
chosen as it permits a somewhat clearer presentation of the intuition.
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which reduces to,
Rt  - Rt+1  #  (1-ä)Ã/ä (24)
Maintaining the fixed exchange rate will be optimal as long as in the next period reserves will
not fall by more than (1-ä)Ã/ä.
This means that if the expected attack is very small relative to the central bank’s
preference for fixed exchange rates, then it can be optimal to deliberately accept the attack rather
than to give up even one period of the fixed exchange rate regime. In this case qT &-1=0 is an
equilibrium. However, this equilibrium is an artifact of the period length. If we consider short
periods, this equilibrium cannot exist (see Appendix). In particular, if we consider a continuous
time model given by the limit of the discrete time models as the period length goes to zero, then
this equilibrium with passive acceptance of the speculative attack is not possible for any set of
parameter values.
8 The size and cost of the speculative attack is not dependent on the period
length, but the opportunity cost of abandoning the fixed exchange rate system one period earlier
is. With short enough periods the opportunity cost is negligible. Therefore if we consider short
periods it will not be optimal for the central bank to remain passive in the face of a predictable
speculative attack. Hence qT &-1 will not be zero in equilibrium. Thus qT &-10(0,1) which completes
the proof of the proposition. ~
Intuitively, if the central bank can predict an oncoming speculative attack then it will wish
to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime just before the attack. Likewise, if speculators can
predict this preemptive abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime, then they will exploit
this knowledge by buying foreign currency just before the abandonment. Thus in order to avoid
a speculative attack the central bank must introduce uncertainty into the decisions of speculators.9Karim Abadir and Harald Uhlig independently pointed out that the central bank’s problem has much in common
with the classic “Surprise Quiz” game. In that game a professor promises the students that there will be a surprise
quiz in the coming week. If the quiz does not occur by Thursday, then the students know that it must occur on
Friday, and thus it is not a surprise. So the professor cannot play a pure strategy of having the exam on Friday. But
if the exam has not occurred by Wednesday the students know it must occur on Thursday, and it will not be a
surprise. So the professor cannot play a pure strategy of having the exam on Thursday. Backwards induction via
the same argument eliminates any pure-strategy for the professor. Similarly, the central bank would like to have the
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime come as a surprise to speculators, and so for the same reason it
cannot play a pure-strategy. 
- 20 -
It cannot follow a predictable pure strategy, since such a strategy would result in a speculative
attack.
9
Therefore qT &-1 cannot be one and it cannot be zero. So qT &-10(0,1), which means that the
central bank must be indifferent between maintaining and abandoning the fixed exchange rate
regime. From (11) and the fact that Vt+1=(Rt+1-Ã)/(1-ä), central bank reserves must be equal to
 Rt = Rt+1 + (1-ä)Ã/ä (25)
For the period t=T &-1, Rt+1=R & which yields the level of reserves in the period T &-1. 
Then, working backward from T &-1, it is possible to establish T _, the earliest state where
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate can be an equilibrium outcome. Iterating the same
argument yields reserves of
 Rt = R & + (T &-t)(1-ä)Ã/ä (26)
Equation (26) describes the equilibrium level of reserves as long as it yields reserves that are less
than those given by equation (6). At that point and earlier qt=0 is an equilibrium and so reserves
will follow (6). The path of reserves can be seen in Figure 2. After T _ reserves decline quickly,
but continuously, until they reach their lower bound at T &.- 21 -
Figure 2: Reserves with an Optimizing Central Bank
Consider the problem of an individual speculator. Suppose that, at the moment, reserves
are high and that in the next period they will be relatively low. The speculator therefore realizes
that the central bank will prefer to abandon the fixed rate regime this period rather than permit
such a large drop in reserves. So he will purchase foreign currency in this period. This means that
the drop in foreign currency reserves will not be as dramatic in the coming period. Therefore, the
central bank will no longer be quite as eager to abandon the fixed rate.
Each speculator will purchase foreign currency as long as the central bank prefers to
abandon the fixed rate. When it is indifferent between abandoning and maintaining the fixed rate,
they will realize that if they purchase additional foreign currency the drop in reserves between
the current period and the next will be small enough so that the central bank will prefer not to
abandon. Since speculation decreases the money supply, it raises the domestic interest rate above
the foreign rate. Hence purchasing foreign currency entails an opportunity cost and they will not
purchase additional foreign currency.
So optimizing behavior on the part of speculators ensures that reserves are at a level
where the central bank either strictly prefers maintaining the fixed exchange rate one more period- 22 -
or is indifferent between abandoning and maintaining the fixed rate. In other words, optimizing
speculators will always ensure that the central bank does not strictly prefer to abandon the fixed
exchange rate regime. If it did so, speculators could make profits by purchasing additional
foreign currency, making abandonment less attractive to the central bank. Since sudden attacks
on foreign currency reserves make preemptive abandonment of the fixed exchange rate attractive,
in equilibrium there can be no such predictable attacks.
Since this point is important, it is worth emphasizing with a counter example. Suppose
that there was a predictable speculative attack, defined as a predictable, sudden, large drop in
reserves. Then just before the drop the central bank would abandon the fixed exchange rate
system, thereby avoiding the attack. If it was planning on doing so, however, speculators would
buy foreign currency just before it did. But this would imply that foreign currency reserves would
already be low by the time of the expected attack, so the drop in reserves would be relatively
small. The same logic applies to the period before, and the period before that. Therefore, in
equilibrium there cannot be a predictable speculative attack.
In the range t<T _ the central bank prefers to continue maintaining the fixed exchange rate
so reserves decline one for one with the expansion of domestic credit. In the period t0[T _, T &)
speculation ensures that the central bank is indifferent between abandoning and maintaining the
fixed rate regime, which implies that reserves are declining at a greater rate.
 From this information on the path of reserves it is straightforward to determine the
behavior of other variables. First the behavior of all the endogenous variables will be derived and
then the intuition for the results will be discussed. During the period t<T _ there is no chance that
the fixed exchange rate will be abandoned (qt=0). This implies that it=i
* and that the shadow
floating exchange rate is given by equation (17). After T _ reserves are given by equation (26) and
domestic credit can always be written as Dt=DT &+(t-T &)µ. The shadow floating exchange rate can
be found by substituting these into (16),
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The bracketed term is equal to the fixed exchange rate by (10) so the shadow floating exchange
rate is simply
(28)
From this, (5), (10), and the fact that T _ is defined as the time where (6) and (26) yield the same
level of reserves, it is straightforward to show that at T _ the shadow floating exchange rate is
, which is equal to (17). So the shadow floating exchange rate is constant ˜ ST,T'¯ S%âµ/(á&âi()2
and above the fixed rate before T _. Then it declines linearly, reaching the fixed exchange rate at
T &.
To examine the behavior of the interest rate in equilibrium note that (1), (3) and (4) must
hold yielding,
it  =  á/â  -  (Rt + Dt)/âS & (29)
and during t0[T _, T &] reserves are given by equation (26) so this can be expressed as,
(30)
Using equation (10) this can be reduced to,
(31)
From the definition of T _ the interest rate is equal to the world rate at T _. It then increases linearly
until it reaches i
*+µ/(á-âi
*)S & at T &.
The one remaining endogenous variable is qt, the probability that the central bank
abandons the fixed exchange regime. This can be derived by noting that (2) implies,
it  = i
* + qt [ (S ~
t,t+1/S &) - 1]  (32)- 24 -
qt '
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*), equation (28) yields,
(33)
At T _, it =i
*, so equation (33) says that the probability of abandoning the fixed exchange rate is
zero at T _. It then increases, at an increasing rate, until it reaches 1 at T &.
It is also worth noting that if we made the additional assumptions of risk neutrality and
perfectly competitive forward markets, the one period ahead forward exchange rate, Ft, would
be equal to the expected exchange rate in the next period, 
Ft = qt S ~
t,t+1 + (1-qt )S & (34)
Combining this with equation (32) yields,
    Ft = [1+(it -i
* )] S & (35)
Let ft denote the one period ahead forward exchange rate premium, defined as
(36)
So the forward exchange rate premium is equal to the interest rate differential, starting at zero
at T _ and rising linearly to µ/(á-âi
*)S & at T &.- 25 -
Figure 3: The evolution of the shadow floating exchange rate, the interest rate differential
and forward exchange rate premium, and the probability of a move to a floating exchange rate
regime.
3.4. Interpretation
These results are summarized in Figure 3. 
Before T _ there is no chance of the central bank abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime. Since
T & is far in the future, the central bank wants to maintain the fixed rate. Reserves are high enough
so that if speculators attacked and drove reserves to R &, forcing a move to a floating exchange
rate, they would contract the money supply to a point where the fixed exchange rate would10The period after T & is also depicted in Figure 3. This is the behavior of the variables off the equilibrium path.
These states will never be reached, the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime will occur with certainty at
or before T &. However, to derive the equilibrium strategies it is necessary to specify the alternative, what would
happen if the optimal strategies were not implemented. This is what is given to the right of T &. These strategies are
precisely the off-equilibrium strategies which are implicit in the traditional analysis of the model. If the fixed
exchange rate is still maintained after T &, then speculators will immediately attack the central bank’s foreign currency
reserves forcing the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate. Therefore Rt=R & and qt=1. This implies that the shadow
floating exchange rate and the interest rate are given by (9) and (2) respectively, which is what is depicted in this
part of Figure 3, but these states will never be observed since the fixed exchange rate will always be abandoned
before they are reached.
- 26 -
exceed the floating rate; hence they do not attack. The domestic interest rate is therefore equal
to the world rate.
After T _ this situation changes. Both speculators and the central bank realize that T & is
approaching and that the fixed exchange rate must be abandoned. This gives the central bank an
incentive to abandon it before speculation drives down foreign currency reserves. But speculators
are aware of this incentive and purchase foreign currency in anticipation of the potential jump
in exchange rates. As time goes by, speculators purchase more foreign currency, always keeping
the central bank indifferent between maintaining and abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime.
This drives up the domestic interest rate and forward exchange rate premium while driving down
the shadow floating exchange rate. Therefore the opportunity cost of holding foreign currency
is increasing, and the benefit to successful speculation is declining. But the probability that
speculation will be successful is increasing rapidly, ensuring that the expected return from
holding foreign currency remains constant at zero. However, in the event of a move to floating
exchange rates the ex post profits from holding foreign currency can be substantial, since the
shadow floating exchange rate is above the fixed rate until T &.
10
4. Conclusion
A version of the Krugman (1979) balance-of-payments crisis model is developed that
explicitly incorporates an optimizing central bank. This permits an analysis of strategic
interaction between the central bank and speculators. In this model the central bank is able to11This can be seen by realizing that in equilibrium the central bank is indifferent between abandoning the fixed
exchange rate anywhere during this period. In particular, it is willing to wait until it is forced to abandon. At that
point the present value of its payoff is the same as it would be if there had been an attack. But on the path to that
point the forward-looking central bank endured increasing speculative pressure, while the myopic central bank did
not.
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choose the timing of the move to floating exchange rates while speculators attempt to predict this
date and exploit it through their foreign currency purchases. It is shown that the central bank has
an incentive to introduce uncertainty into the decisions of speculators. By doing so it is possible
for the central bank to avoid predictable speculative attacks. This is true even when the only
policy instrument available to the central bank is the decision to abandon or continue maintaining
the fixed exchange rate regime. When central banks have more sophisticated policy instruments
at their disposal, avoiding predictable attacks is even easier. Thus the hypothesis of predictable
speculative attacks is inconsistent with forward-looking behavior on the part of central banks.
The existence of speculators causes the central bank to abandon the fixed exchange rate
much earlier than it would have in their absence. This is true in equilibrium even though there
are no speculative attacks. With capital mobility and an optimizing central bank it is the threat
of such attacks that causes the central bank to abandon the fixed exchange rate. Even when we
do not observe significant speculation, the presence of speculators can have an important effect
on the decisions of the monetary authority. In fact, the earliest abandonments of fixed exchange
rates will be accompanied by low speculation. But these abandonments are the ones whose
timings have been most affected by the presence of speculators.
There is an important element of time inconsistency here. Rather than enduring the
protracted period of decreasing reserves that it must face in equilibrium, the central bank would
prefer the equilibrium of the myopic model. In the myopic model the central bank had relatively
high reserves right up to the attack. While the speculative attack is costly for the central bank,
it is not as costly as the protracted period of increasing speculation.
11 The central bank would like
to convince speculators that it will not abandon the fixed exchange rate unless reserves are driven
down so far that continued maintenance is impossible. While it would like to be able to commit
to this policy, in practice it cannot. Speculators know that the central bank has an incentive to- 28 -
abandon the fixed exchange rate policy just before they are expected to attack. The central bank’s
announced policy is not credible, and so in equilibrium it must endure a protracted period of
increasing speculation. 
In practice, central banks almost universally claim that they will never, under any
circumstances, abandon fixed exchange rate regimes. They are, in effect, claiming to be myopic.
In equilibrium it is, in fact, preferable to be myopic, but it is not credible. In the absence of a
device which irrevocably commits the central bank to the policy, rational speculators will not
believe these claims. It should be noted that this is not an argument in favor of currency boards,
in spite of the fact that currency boards cannot legally abandon fixed exchange rate regimes.
Since any government with the power to institute a currency board also has the power to abolish
it, currency boards do not solve the time inconsistency problem. They simply transfer the
problem from the central bank to the government. 
With a forward-looking monetary authority, there is an incentive to introduce uncertainty
into the decisions of speculators. If speculators are certain of the conditions that will cause the
central bank to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime, they will engage in a sudden speculative
attack just before the abandonment. In order to avoid such attacks the central bank must ensure
that speculators are not certain of what it will do. This endogenous uncertainty implies that the
timing of the move to a floating exchange rate cannot be known with certainty, even in a
completely non-stochastic structure. Fundamentals move deterministicly but the outcome is
stochastic. However, while the date of the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime cannot
be known with certainty, fundamentals confine the abandonment to a bounded set of dates. The
variables that determined the attack date in the traditional analysis also help determine the
possible dates of a breakdown with an optimizing central bank. Thus the model is consistent with
the wealth of empirical evidence found using the traditional approach. Moreover, with an
optimizing central bank the probability of abandonment at each date can be completely specified.
This derived expression for the probability of abandoning the fixed exchange rate is
remarkably similar to that assumed by Cumby and Van Wijnbergen in their 1989 empirical work
on Argentina’s crawling peg. In order to capture the idea that changing the exchange rate regime12Abstracting from their rich stochastic structure, Cumby and Van Wijnbergen’s assumption




k2 % k3(¯ T&t)
& k4
the kis are positive functions of parameters. These expressions for the probability of abandoning the fixed exchange
rate system are quite similar and evolve in much the same way but there is no set of parameters in this model which
would make them identical, k1=k2=k3=1 is not possible. Nevertheless, Cumby and Van Wijnbergen’s estimation
method can be easily extended to use related specifications of the probability of abandonment.
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is a policy decision they assume that the conditional p.d.f. of the level of reserves at the time of
abandonment is distributed uniformly. This assumption implies that the probability of
abandonment evolves quite similarly to equation (33).
12 Hence it is possible to think of this paper
as a theoretical foundation for their earlier empirical work, or, conversely, their empirical work
as an ex ante test of this type of model. 
The implication of this endogenous probability of abandonment is that the time near an
abandonment of a fixed exchange rate is likely to be characterized by a high degree of
uncertainty. This uncertainty is not an exogenous feature of fixed exchange rates but rather is
introduced endogenously and deliberately by the central bank in an attempt to move to a floating
exchange rate regime before a speculative attack.
The seminal work of Harsanyi (1973) provides an additional interpretation of this
endogenous uncertainty. If speculators were unsure of the objective function being used by the
central bank, or about the current level of reserves, then the central bank would use a pure
strategy. However, equilibrium uncertainty would be present due to this exogenous uncertainty
about the central bank’s objective function. Harsanyi’s insight is that as this exogenous
uncertainty goes to zero, the equilibrium uncertainty does not. In fact, the probability of
abandoning the fixed exchange rate at each time approaches the probabilities found in the model.
This remarkable fact implies that even arbitrarily small uncertainty about the central bank’s
objective function or foreign currency reserves will lead to very large uncertainty about the
conditions under which the central bank will abandon the fixed exchange rate regime. Hence, it
is not realistic to presume that if speculators have reasonably good information about the central
bank’s objective function and about central bank foreign currency holdings, that they will be able- 30 -
to deduce good estimates of the conditions under which the central bank will abandon the fixed
exchange rate regime.
This endogenous uncertainty means that prior to the switch in exchange rate regimes there
are increasing domestic interest rates, and increasing forward exchange rate premia over the fixed
exchange rate. In addition, the exchange rate may jump during the move to the floating rate,
yielding ex post profits to foreign currency speculators. These are attractive features of the
optimizing model that in the traditional model could only be induced through exogenous shocks.
The exogenous shock approach implies that the length of the period of increasing interest rates
and forward exchange rate premia is directly related to the size of the expected shocks.
Additionally, in the traditional model the size of a jump in the exchange rate is directly related
to the size of the last shock. In fact the magnitude of the jump must be less than the jump that
would occur if the same shock hit in a flexible exchange rate environment. With an optimizing
central bank, however, these empirically observed phenomena are no longer the result of
exogenous shocks. They arise in equilibrium even in this non-stochastic framework due to the
endogenous uncertainty introduced by the central bank.
The results are encouraging for the viability of temporary nominal anchor policies to
combat runaway expectations-driven inflation. By introducing uncertainty into speculators’
decisions, it is in fact possible for a central bank to leave a fixed exchange rate regime gracefully,
even when the abandonment is anticipated by rational speculators. Nevertheless, the results of
the model also suggest that these policies are likely to be very dangerous. During the time leading
up to the abandonment of the fixed rate regime, the existence of rational speculators ensures that
the central bank is indifferent between maintaining and abandoning the fixed exchange rate. This
means that the central bank will be very vulnerable to shifts in peoples’ perceptions of its
commitment to the announced policy. Any perceived weakness, or any negative shock could13See, for example, Obstfeld (1995) for a model where exogenous shocks can alter the central bank’s tradeoff
between fixed and floating exchange rates. Typically in models of this type the central bank is initially assumed to
strictly prefer fixed exchange rates. Nevertheless, large enough negative shocks can decrease the attractiveness of
fixed rates, and create the potential for a speculative attack. The danger would be even greater starting from a
position of indifference between the two exchange rate regimes.
14Actually, this result does not depend on the monetary authority per se, but rather on speculators’ perceptions of
the monetary authority, since it is speculators who engage in speculative attacks and the strategy of the central bank
is not observable to them. In the model, rationality implies that perceptions are the same as reality. In the real world
this may not necessarily be the case. However, as long as speculators perceive that the central bank is behaving
rationally, there cannot be predictable speculative attacks.
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cause a sudden crash.
13 Seen in this light, it is not surprising that while we do see several
successful implementations of nominal anchor policies (most notably Poland and Israel), the list
of dramatic failures is much longer. However, this is the first paper that addresses this issue and
the reader should be aware that it uses a very stylized model that does not incorporate many of
the features that are important to the success of nominal anchor policies. Work still needs to be
done in more fully specified models to see how the central bank’s incentive to introduce
uncertainty into speculators’ decisions affects the adjustment of inflationary expectations, and
how this incentive interacts with the possibility of rational and self-fulfilling expectations of
attacks.
An important implication of introducing an optimizing monetary authority is that it
implies that speculative attacks cannot be precipitated by predictable movements in
fundamentals. If speculative attacks were predictable, the central bank would avoid them by
abandoning the fixed exchange rate system just before they occurred. However, this would mean
that the breakdown of the fixed rate regime was predictable and rational speculators would
exploit this, resulting in an earlier attack. But the same logic would apply to that attack as well.
Therefore, in equilibrium, speculative attacks cannot be predictable in a world with optimizing
monetary authorities.
14
This does not imply that speculative attacks do not depend on fundamentals. Many
models of speculative attacks with optimizing monetary authorities imply that the existence of
multiple equilibria depends on fundamentals. See Cole and Kehoe (1996a and 1996b), Davies
and Vines (1995), Obstfeld (1994 and 1996), Ozkan and Sutherland (1998), and Velasco (1997).- 32 -
The point is that while the conditions for a speculative attack may depend on predictable
fundamentals, the precise time of a speculative attack cannot. An implication of this is that in
models with multiple equilibria the coordination of speculator expectations on a particular
equilibrium cannot depend on predictable variables, since otherwise the central bank could
predict the attack, and therefore avoid it. The coordination of speculator expectations can,
however, depend on the unpredictable components of predictable variables, including the
unpredictable components of fundamentals.15The original Krugman (1979) model was cast in continuous time.
- Appendix pg. 1 -
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Appendix
To examine the possibility that the model might be able to generate Krugman style
speculative attacks with a frequently optimizing central bank, the analysis is extended to allow
for an arbitrary period length, n. Low values of n imply frequent decision making on the part of
the central bank and the preceding analysis is a special case where n=1. A continuous time
version of the model can be examined by taking the limit of the discrete time models as n60.
Equations (1), (3) and (4) are not dependent on the period length and can be retained
without modification, noting only that it in the money demand equation (3) refers to the interest
return over calender time 1. Therefore the per-period interest rate is given by nit, so equation (2)
becomes, 
     nit = ni
* + Et [ (St+1/St) -1 ] (37)
and (5) is,
       Dt = Dt-1 + nµ (38)
From these equations the shadow floating exchange rate in the traditional model can be derived
using the same method to show that (9) still holds. The time of the speculative attack in the
traditional model T & is given by S ~
t=S & which implies that reserves fall by âµ/(á-âi
*) at T &. So the
size of the speculative attack in the traditional model is not dependent on the period length. This
is unsurprising since the model generates attacks in continuous time as well.
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Now moving to the problem of the central bank, the central bank’s per-period discount
rate is ä
n. It’s per-period payoff is proportional to the period length: nRt with fixed exchange rates
and n(Rt-Ã) with floating rates. Therefore the central bank’s maximization problem is 
(39)- Appendix pg. 2 -
We are interested here in whether it is optimal for the central bank to set qT &-1=0 knowing
that there will be a speculative attack in the next period. If this is so, then from the maximization
of (39),
n(RT &-1-Ã)/(1-ä
n) # nRT &-1 + ä
nVT & (40)
Since there will be a speculative attack in T &, reserves will fall to R &, and the fixed exchange rate
will be abandoned. Therefore, VT &=n(R &-Ã)/(1-ä
n). So in order for qT &-1=0 to be an equilibrium it
must be the case that,
(41)
n( R ¯ T & 1&Ã )
(1&än)
# nR ¯ T & 1 %
nä n(R¯ T& Ã)
(1&än)
which reduces to,
RT &-1 - RT & # (1-ä
n)Ã/ä
n (42)
Since reserves fall by nµ each period just due to expanding domestic credit and since there will
be a speculative attack depleting reserves by âµ/(á-âi






n - nµ (43)
This condition must hold for it to be optimal for the central bank to remain passive in the face
of an expected speculative attack. In the limit as n60 the right hand side goes to zero and the
inequality cannot hold for any set of parameters. Therefore with short periods there cannot be an
equilibrium where the central bank remains passive in the face of a predictable speculative attack.References
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